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MANAGERIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE WORLD￿￿ S NEED:
PERCEPTION AND MISPERCEPTION IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
Does the practice of international relations today involve,
in significant degree, misperception between governments? If so,
what should be done at the world￿￿ s universities, through
research and curriculum development, to correct these
misperceptions?
The current historical period offers a remarkable
opportunity to study misperception in the conduct of
international relations. The period since World War II now
provides a time series of over 45 years  ￿  in a relatively stable
international system - to study the bi-lateral relations of
nations. At least on the American side, the policy making record
is more open than any major power in history; the quality of
reporting in the elite press has been high; both investigative
reporters and Congressional investigators give comparatively
rapid access to details of major, controversial, decisions.
Consequently, scholars can do more than study single
decisions. They can study bi-lateral relationships and similar
decisions across decades. They can contrast the perceptions of
decision makers in different countries. They have a sufficiently
large number of cases (in a statistical sense) to reach1 The still-classic study of mutual misperception is
Neustadt￿￿ s analysis (1970) of the Skybolt missile cancellation.
George and Smoke (1974) pioneered the method of focused
comparisons. Lebow (1987) reviews research concerning the
management of crises. Hermann (1979) reviews the effects of
stress on decision processes. A wider range of cognitive
processes are surveyed in Axelrod (1976), especially the chapter
by Hoisti, and Tetlock and McGuire (1986). Etheredge (1976),
George (1980) and Shepard (1988) review the literature concerning
personality effects. A forthcoming data base (CASCON) assembled
by Bloomfield at MIT will include all major post World War II
conflicts, systematically coded. Janis (1989) provides an
excellent discussion and wide-ranging bibliography. A series of
case studies, which may prove cumulative and theoretically
useful, has been funded by the Pew Charitable Trusts (1988): the
initiative would benefit from greater participation by foreign
scholars, especially if American decision makers have been prone
to ethnocentric misperceptions. Horowitz (1989) reviews lessons
from inter-group, ethnic conflict. The U. S. State Department￿￿ s
internal studies to inform future practitioners (e.g., Bendabmane
and McDonald, 1985) are a worthy source of hypotheses. The rigor
possible with computer simulation is suggested by such scholars
as Alker (1987) and Mefford (1987). See also Blight (1989) and
the forthcoming volume edited by George Breslauer and Philip
Tetlock concerning learning in Soviet-American relations,
especially the work of S. Weber.
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conclusions about the quality of decision processes, comparing
the outcomes decision makers anticipated with the record of how
events turned out.
The new opportunity to draw useful lessons across several
decades of return engagements is actively engaging social
scientists who specialize in American foreign (e.g., Etheredge,
1981, 1985; Neustadt and May, 1986; Bundy, 1988).1 This
conference also responds to these new opportunities. It examines
one bi ￿lateral relationship across 40 years. The results may be
broadly informative if patterns of misperception observed in the3
Greek ￿American case also occur more widely.
I have been asked to suggest a framework for the study of
perception and misperception in Greek-American relations.
My plan is to be selective: I will discuss five groups of
hypotheses I believe are among the most promising, drawn from
theories of a.) the  ￿beginner￿￿ s ￿ cognitive biases of
individuals; b.) cognitive growth through experience; c.)
decision processes within the Executive branch; d.) network
theory; and e.) a new proposal for the application of public
drama theories.
A Caveat:  The Null Hypothesis
First, a caveat. It is highly controversial whether there
are any significant misperceptions in international relations.
International behavior is analyzed differently by two academic
traditions which seldom talk with one another. The Realpolitik
school perceives the forms of power ￿related behavior to be
sufficiently universal, and power maximization (subject to
objective restraints) so ubiquitous a motivation of politicians
and states, that one can - like economists developing models of
firms or economies - develop a general theory of international
behavior based only upon knowing a state￿￿ s relative place in the
international system, without extensive regard for the2 And vice versa.
3 American (or Greek) foreign policy may be penetrated by
complex ethnocentrisms (e.g., LeVine and Campbell, 1972; Wiarda,
1985; Etheredge, 1988). I leave aside these propositions here.
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particulars of its culture, history, or internal political
organization. Politicians are politicians. Greek politicians are
only American politicians in a different setting.2
By contrast, the academic tradition of area studies feels it
necessary to have years of foreign language training and
immersion in the details of history, culture, and politics,
before an outsider could begin to guess how Greeks (or Chinese,
or Russians or Iranians or Americans) think about themselves or
make their foreign policy choices. The  ￿other ￿ is very difficult
to know.3
With this background  ￿  and warning that some political
scientists would consider the exercise foolish  ￿  I suggest the
following starting points:
RELEVANT THEORIES
A. Cognitive Psychology of Novices
One tradition of research in cognitive psychology reflects a
belief that rigorous scientific training - and the analytical5
style of thought associated with it - increases an individual￿￿ s
ability to understand the political world. Many social science
departments train their doctoral students to use the full power
of the rigorous scientific methods, developed in the natural
sciences, to understand the political world with this belief in
mind.
Research in this tradition has shown many human beings are
slip-shod scientists (e.g., Kahneman et al., 1982). And the
research has done more: it has documented non-random,
characteristic biases, that can be considered beginners￿￿  or
novice￿￿ s biases, as the natural (flawed) baselines of thinking
in the general population.
This may be an important insight for the study of
international relations. If these same beginners￿￿  biases can be
found in foreign policy, and if scientific method is
the standard for realism and success, then we have found a
powerful set of explanations for previous history and correctives
to improve international relations.
There are several such mechanisms that Jervis (l976) has
argued can be observed prominently in international4 Simon (1990) discusses the general study of novice biases,
and novice-expert shifts.
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relations:4
(1) A virtuous self ￿image.
(2) A tendency to blame other people￿￿ s characteristics
for their behavior but to explain one￿￿ s own behavior as a
response to circumstances. (America fights in Vietnam for good
reasons, and because it is forced to do so; but Greece disputes
Turkey over Cyprus because Greek decision makers are irrational.)
(3) A perception that we are the target. With this
egocentric bias, decision makers will tend to perceive the
motivation of other nations￿￿  behavior as primarily expressing
intentions related to themselves. They would personalize
international politics and perceive what happens in Greece (or
America) as directed by forces whose primary intention is to be
friendly or hostile to America (or Greece).
(4) A perception of unitary actors. Thus, if this
mechanism is present, American decision makers will view Greece
and the Greek government as a single entity (and vice versa) with
little grasp of internal disagreements or the domestic processes
affecting the balance toward one outcome or another.7
These mechanisms we can group together into an initial
hypothesis that a set of  ￿beginners￿￿  biases, ￿ with the contents
identified by Jervis, will be the naturally-occurring baseline of
misperception in bi-lateral relations:
Hypothesis 1:
Perceptions in international relations will have a natural
baseline to be egocentric and personalized. impressionistic,
over-confident, and under-informed.
     Besides its possible technical accuracy, another benefit to
selecting the scientific ideal as a guide to realistic perception
deserves mention. Science is not only a strategy for empirical
investigation and self-correcting empirical inquiry but also a
rhetoric of public discourse designed to manage emotion. As
Geertz (1973, pp. 230 ￿231) put it:
 ￿The differentia of science and politics as cultural
systems are to be sought in the sorts of symbolic
strategy of encompassing situations that they
respectively represent. Science names the structure of
situations in such a way that the attitude contained
toward them is one of disinterestedness. Its style is
restrained, spare, resolutely analytic: by shunning the8
semantic devices that most effectively formulate moral
sentiment, it seeks to maximize intellectual clarity.
But ideology names the structure of situations in such a
way that the attitude contained toward them is one of
commitment. Its style is ornate, vivid, deliberately
suggestive: by objectifying moral sentiment through the
same devices that science shuns, it seeks to motivate
action. Both are concerned with the definition of a
problematic situation... .But the information needed is
quite different, even in cases where the situation is
the same. An ideologist is no more a poor social
scientist than a social scientist is a poor ideologist.
The two are - or at least they ought to be - in quite
different lines of work... ￿
     Thus, if the professional conduct of international relations
is a nascent scientific enterprise we might obtain, as part of
the scientific package, a political (and diplomatic) strategy
that can calm - or at least control -  strong, complicating emotion
in discussion of foreign policy and perhaps slowly transform the
conduct of Greek ￿American, Greek ￿Turkish, and other international
relations. (The associated caution also should be apparent: if
some issues ought to be discussed with passion, or some realities
characterized by terms with pejorative connotation, a growing
scientific discourse may subtly shift the discussion of reality9
in a way that reduces moral intelligence or inhibits necessary
political communication (etc.).)
The attraction of a scientific framework can be so
compelling that I must ask the reader￿￿ s indulgence to record a
further skeptical thought. Politics (involving human beings and
interpersonal relations) is both an art and a science. Thus, it
may misconstrue and injure the complex, multi-level sensibilities
of capable politicians to apply only a standard scientific
framework to analyze (and improve) their perceptions. Larson
(1986), for example, criticized President Truman for logical
inconsistency in his responses to the Soviet Union in the early
post World War II period. But Truman￿￿ s ambivalences, to which he
gave voice, may have reflected an honest, human engagement with
contradictions in reality and have been part of a creative
process of political judgment and decision making. Logical
contradiction (or alleged conflicting perceptions) may be as
valuable to political success as harmonies and dissonances in a
work of music - or the ability to perceive and mix bold reds with
subtle blues, hard edges and soft curves, in the visual arts.
B. Individual Learning and Cognitive Development
A second line of investigation in cognitive psychology,10
developed carefully in the work of Axelrod (1976) and Tetlock
(e.g., Tetlock and McGuire, 1986; see also the discussion of
novice-expert shifts in Simon, 1990), focuses attention on the
potential for cognitive development, especially the ability to
recognize complex features of reality and to keep these elements
in mind, in an integrated way, when a decision maker thinks about
a problem. Such abilities seem to predict greater realism and
success in political life; and it is a reasonable conjecture that
individual decision makers and diplomats, as they gain experience
in Greek-American relations, will develop greater integrated
complexity in perceptions and cognitive maps.
Yet, it is also notable that the American government (at
least) is designed to produce frequent turn-over at the high
decision making levels (Heclo, 1977). And its Ambassadors and
career diplomats are frequently rotated among posts.
Thus, we may derive two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2: Experience (of individuals) in the conduct of
bi ￿lateral relations will tend to correct the perceptual biases
identified in hypothesis 1 and to replace them with more complex.
integrated. and realistic cognitive maps. However:11
Hypothesis 3: Frequent government personnel changes will
tend to prevent any individual learning from becoming dependably
institutionalized in bi-lateral relations.
C. Small Group Processes
A third, suggestive line of research focuses on decision
making practices, especially occurring in small groups at the
senior level of governments. Alexander George (1973, 1980) and
Irving Janis (e.g., Janis and Mann, 1977; Janis, 1989) have
argued that, whatever the initial misconceptions of individuals,
a rigorous and systematic decision process in a government
should, in principle, reduce or eliminate misperceptions. Janis
and Mann identify seven characteristics of what they call high
quality,  ￿vigilant ￿ decision making (Janis and Mann, 1977; Janis,
1989, pp. 30-31). Decision makers who engage in these practices:
1. Survey a wide range of objectives to be fulfilled,
taking account of the multiplicity of values that are at stake.
2. Canvass a wide range of alternative courses of action.
3. Intensively search for new information relevant to
evaluating the alternatives.12
4. Correctly assimilate and take account of new information
or expert judgments to which they are exposed, even when the
information or judgment does not support the course of action
initially preferred.
5. Reconsider the positive and negative consequences of
alternatives originally regarded as unacceptable, before making a
final choice.
6. Carefully examine the costs and risks of negative
consequences, as well as positive consequences, that could flow
from the alternative that is preferred.
7. Make detailed provisions for implementing and monitoring
the chosen course of action, with special attention to
contingency plans that might be required if various known risks
were to materialize.
Thus, we can propose:
Hypothesis 4: For each decision. on either side. the
better the decision process (by Janis￿￿ s criteria) the greater
the accuracy of perception in bi-lateral relations.13
Especially suggestive evidence for the causal (corrective)
role of good decision making processes is a study by Herek,
Janis, and Huth (1987a, 1987b; Janis, 1989, chapter 6) of 19
major crisis decisions in post World War II American foreign
policy. Independent and separate blind ratings of both the
technical quality of the American decision process and of the
favorableness or unfavorableness of the outcomes of the decisions
showed a .64 (p <.002) correlation between the technical quality
of the decision process and the favorableness, in retrospect, of
the outcome. The American decision to intervene in the Greek
civil war was among those decisions rated: it was recorded to be
of high technical quality and to have yielded a favorable outcome
(see, however, the criticisms of Andreopoulous in this volume.).
Equally notable is that, for a majority of these 19 crucial
American foreign policy decisions in the post World War II period
(58%), the American government did not meet the criteria (cited
above) for a high quality deliberative process (Janis, 1989, pp.
125 ￿126).
D. Network Theory
Network theory has become increasingly prominent in the
explanation of American domestic policy. It also points to a new
type of influence in international relations and policy making
whose impact might usefully be explored to understand the quality
of Greek ￿American relations.5 See also Saunders (1988) for a discussion of supplementary
diplomacy and a valuable contribution to the philosophy of
international relationships. Halley (1985) reviews cross ￿
national ethnic group ties.
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An earlier conception of American domestic politics was
that policies were created, in part, by conflict and cooperation
among interest groups representing well-defined constituencies.
By contrast, the new conception of policy networks views
discussions among committed and responsible individual as
increasingly influential to the creation of public policy in
recent decades (e.g., Heclo, 1978).
These policy-influencing elites serve functions similar to
those which members of the Council on Foreign Relations have
sometimes performed in key American foreign policy relations:
they sustain policy discussions during periods between dramatized
crises; they explore and develop options; they can foster
informal apprenticeships for younger members; their members can
be recruited for policy making posts, and new decision makers can
count upon informed support from other members when they are in
office.5
Do networks of influential person-to-person conversations
shape international relations outside the formal processes of6 Also, predictive efficacy is not a primary criteria. See
Etheredge (1986) for an extended discussion and a pragmatic
critique of over-dramatized perception in a series of cases in
American foreign policy.
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inter-governmental communications (e.g., Kochen, 1989)? From
network theory we can draw hypothesis 5:
Hypothesis 5: The accuracy of perception in bi-lateral
relations will be causally related to the development, and
influence of informal policy networks among responsible
individuals, in both countries. seriously committed to the
quality of the relationship.
E. Public Drama Management
A fifth set of hypotheses can be drawn from the view of
international relations as the management of a public drama of
power relations. By this view, America￿￿ s broader political
conception of global political drama, national interest, and its
appropriate role in history partly creates perceptions of other
actors, of problems, and salient features of relationships.
     This theory is a radical departure from the scientific ideal
of perception we considered earlier.6 By public drama theory,16
American policy makers are not guided, in each bi ￿lateral
relationship, by perceptions other nations or  ￿objective ￿
observers use - nor by perceptions derived - scientifically - to
best model or predict the nature and dynamics of particular local
realities. Rather, the perceptions on which they act are
political overlays that often violate a basic scientific rule of
objective perception (inter ￿observer agreement).
An illustration of this way to understand perception is
America￿￿ s involvement in Vietnam, as viewed by Assistant
Secretary of Defense John McNaughton. In 1965, McNaughton wrote
that 70 percent of the justification for sending American
soldiers to Vietnam was to avoid a humiliating U.S. defeat, 20
percent was to keep South Vietnam out of Chinese hands and only
10 percent was to permit the people of South Vietnam to enjoy a
better, freer way of life (Surnivess, 1988). The governing
perceptions and definitions of the situation on which American
policy makers acted had little to do with the categories used to
describe their war by most of the indigenous people.
Here is another -  vividly top-down example - of international
perceptions in a public drama. French President Charles De Gaulle
is lecturing Dean Rusk (in private) about how to perceive
European political reality:17
 ￿ ￿Well, what is Europe?￿￿  Pointing with his finger
as if at an imaginary map, he said,  ￿Here are the Benelux
countries.￿￿  And he brushed them aside with a wave of his
hand.  ￿In the south, there is Italy,￿￿  and he scoffed,
 ￿Psshhh. Then, there is Germany,￿￿  he continued,  ￿and Germany
must be kept in its place, And there are the British. But
the British are not Europeans, they are Anglo-Saxons.￿￿  Then
he smiled benignly,  ￿And here is France at the heart of
Europe, the soul of European culture.￿￿  ￿ (Schoenbaum, 1988,
p. 359.)
Another example of unilateral, top-down perception in
international power relationships is the traditional Chinese view
of international relations - i.e., that they are the Middle
Kingdom, located between Heaven (above) and the non ￿Chinese
barbarians (below) and ruled by the Son of Heaven:
 ￿The Confucian view of the foreigner depends partly on the
stress given to the unique nature of the earthly authority
delegated to the Son of Heaven. Such authority precludes the
need for or the legality of other political units, and
comprizes a temporal power over all members of the civilized
world... Thus once a barbarian people has shown itself18
sufficiently well-educated to appreciate the benefits of
Chinese authority, it qualifies to become a full member of
the empire. Subject peoples can acknowledge his [Emperor￿￿ s]
authority by the payment of material tribute whose presence
at court serves to enhance the Emperor￿￿ s majesty and to
demonstrate the universal acceptance of his title to power. ￿
(Michael Loewe, quoted in Bell, 1985, pp. 266  ￿  267.)
In these last two cases, the perceptions of General De
Gaulle or Chinese Emperors are not scientifically derived but
express a social (political) relationship in the mind of the
beholder. In both cases, the perceptions are unilateral. Thus,
the possibility for agreement among the perceptions of different
actors in international relations may have an upper bound: there
is no reason - in public drama theory - to expect rational
scientific discussion, based upon conventional notions of truth
and falsity, to alter such perceptions or reconcile perceptual
differences.
This hypothesis can be summarized as:
Hypothesis 6:
American perceptions in bi-lateral alliance relations will
reflect the role assigned to its allies by American decision7 The term  ￿managerial, ￿ both describes this system of
perception and points to its origin in the American institutions
that have been the training ￿ground for most American decision
makers and advisors (most are not professional politicians but
are socialized in bureaucratic elites).
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makers. especially a role to defer to America￿￿ s alliance
leadership and support America￿￿ s primary strategic purpose.
since World War II. to contain Soviet aggression and prevent
changes perceived to be caused by Soviet aggression.
While perceptions, assigned by an actor in a public drama,
may be unilateral (or autistic), they are also fundamentally
social because the role relationships are (in the mind of the
beholder) in reciprocal definition (e.g., Alker, 1987; Etheredge,
1985; Hare, 1985). I have titled this paper  ￿Managerial
Responsibility and the World￿￿ s Need ￿ to suggest specific details
of the reciprocally-defined system of roles and perceptions that
may be at work in the Greek-American relationship on the American
side.
My thesis is that America￿￿ s commitment to a role of world
leadership after World War II engaged a managerial mindset that
has structured perceptions of the world.7 In alliance
relationships, this drama of leadership has been politically (and
hierarchically) structured so American decision makers look20
outward, and somewhat downward, when thinking about other members
of alliances.
Kanter and Stein (1979) imply a distinctly hierarchical
feature of American organizational psychology. I suggest this
template has generalized outward, since World War II, to inform
American perceptions of its role in relationship with its allies.
In their analysis, large American organizations evolve three
distinct hierarchical levels and cultures: elite, middle-
management (white collar), and the workers (blue collar). I will
develop the theory that such a template is at work in Greek=-
American relations - acknowledging a debt to Kanter and Stein,
and to a more rigorous formulation by Jaques (1990) and Krausz
(1986), without making them responsible for my extrapolations.
The elite level - - the boardroom - is marked by courtesy and
sensitivity, the understanding of others as unique human beings.
People are taken to be autonomous human beings, the code is
voluntary agreements, civility, and respect for the feelings of
other elite members. It is a cosmopolitan world. A gentleman￿￿ s
word is his bond. He is taken to be responsible for his actions,
expected to be professional and self-disciplined, self-starting,21
and concerned with long ￿term objectives and consequences. He is
also expected to have the rationality, ability, and stature to
plan and organize his work to produce results.
Looking downward, the elite managerial outlook perceives
deficiencies in self-starting behavior and responsibility among
those of lower status. Lower down, people do not always take
responsibility to do a job or act in the long-term best interests
of the organization - they take responsibility to do what they
are told (in frameworks created by others). . .  and then, often,
they only do 80% of that. Left on their own, the middle rungs are
not yet wholly professionals or trustworthy about maintaining
standards and commitments to long ￿term results.
Further down, of course, are the workers -  even more
suspect in their lack of managerial qualities -  in need of
leadership and inspiration, apt to be emotionalistic and to have
short-term cognitive horizons. To self-starting managers at the
top, the world is divided into two classes (in Reich￿￿ s phrase),
the entrepreneurs and the drones (Reich, 1988), with
middle ￿managers in-between.
     These rules of top ￿down perception can be stated more
formally (Table 1):22
Table 1
Rules of Top-Down Perception
 ￿ Those of lower status are more emotion ￿driven and are less
capable of abstract thinking and of creating and sustaining
long ￿term plans.
- Those of lower status are less responsible about designing and
sustaining collective long ￿term programs.
 - Those of lower status are less inclined to sustain principles
as a basis of social and political organization and are more
susceptible to actions determined by personalistic relations,
to manipulation by rhetoric, charisma, and the slogans of mass
movements.
 ￿  Those of lower status tend to blame leaders and authority for
their problems rather than themselves.
 ￿ Critics of lower status do not address long-term issues
responsibly (as do the principal, managerial actors) but23
function - reactively - like a chorus in a classic Greek drama.
The content of their criticism has diminished standing and it
is appropriate to respond by  ￿calming ￿ or manipulation (rather
than serious discussion.)24
These rules imply, to be candid, that American decision
makers have viewed the prospects of armed, nationalistic
conflict between Greece and Turkey as inherently immature.
Their roles have not been managed responsibly by Greek
politicians who ought to have been more far-sighted, self-
disciplined, and appreciate the greater political maturity and
compelling logic of America￿￿ s concern for an anti-Communist
alliance - and peace among members of NATO in the face of the
Soviet threat.
By this theory, American perceptions have probably
rendered several major Greek preoccupations as childish Thus,
American decision makers have sought to manage both Greek
public opinion - and the selection of Greek political leaders -
to assure responsible, satisfactory outcomes. These perceptions
lie behind official action but may not be candidly expressed:
to elite decision makers these are issues that (as the phrasing
goes)  ￿are not helpful to discuss in public. ￿
This conception of public drama and reciprocally defined
roles, may be slightly less pejorative that other conceptions.
For example, Couloumbis (1980) has written of the  ￿paternalism
and penetration ￿ that has characterized American policy toward25
Greece. But  ￿paternalism, ￿ (if that is a correct term) would be
justified by American perceptions that the conduct of Greek
politicians required such a response  ￿  and, I suggest, the
character of American interventions in Greek internal politics
has the logic (born of annoyance and frustration with
circumstances in Greece) of firing middle ￿level managers of
dubious competence. One suspects that although (as I suggested
above) it would never be said in public before the kind of
people about who it is perceived to be true, American
Presidents have had similar perceptions and justified American
interventions in Greece by such logic.
In fairness, I emphasize that, in this new model I have
proposed,  ￿managerial responsibility ￿ in American alliance
relations is not generated primarily by arrogance Rather, the
nature of the intention, I think, has been managerial in a
constructive sense, a response, as I suggested in my title, to
a perception of "the world￿￿ s need ￿ in the post-World War II
period. (But it also true that such a model can be self ￿
fulfilling, with repeated interventions and management of Greek
internal political processes maintaining  ￿ or worsening  ￿ the
alleged irresponsible behavior of middle managers.)26
Thus, a conception of public drama management, focusing
attention on elite managerial psychology in hierarchical
relations, suggests:
Hypothesis 7:  ￿  American views in Greek ￿American
relations will reflect a perceptual schema of reciprocally-
defined roles derived from American organizational psychology. 
This perceptual overlay will evidence the characteristic
perceptions outlined in Table 1.
Summary
Let me, now, weave together these five strands of theory
into a framework to tell the story of perception and
misperception. It is a preliminary aid to inquiry, not a
conclusion; but I suggest studies in American bi-lateral
relations will be a story of perception and misperception -
with both forward movement and backsliding  ￿  along the
following lines:
 ￿ A set of impressionistic beginners￿￿  biases;27
- Which, for individual policy makers may slowly give way,
through experience, to more refined and integrated
understandings;
- Or be collectively improved-upon when (possibly in the
minority of cases) there is a vigilant, high-quality,
decision process;
- - Yet, at the systemic level, changes in diplomatic and
political personnel will produce a tendency for American
and other governments to forget these lessons of
individuals (and not to know they have been forgotten),
thus tending to recycle inter-governmental perceptions
backward to step 1.
 ￿ The accuracy of mutual perceptions will be increased to
the extent there are active networks of policy
influencing elites, external to the formal government
bureaucracies, which lay track, maintain learning
through supporting apprenticeship systems and unofficial
communication networks, and whose members can be
recruited to (and are supported in) public office.28
- An upper bound to the extent of shared perception in will
be created by American definitions of its own broader
strategic role, which will assign a related role for the other
nation in an alliance to play. American perceptions will be
primarily concerned with whether foreign leaders play this
role to American standards. In alliance relations, foreign
politicians and publics will be perceived, and judged as,
within a template of organizational psychology drawn from
American culture, as partly autonomous subordinates within a
hierarchical, managerial framework.
Concluding Remarks
In the short- or intermediate-term, if government policies
are wrong ￿headed or out of touch with reality, one can hold
accountable the decision makers in power. But as the years go by,
it is appropriate to widen the causal framework to explain the
perpetuation of misperception in international relations: it is
the role of universities (in both Greece and America) to codify
the lessons of experience and to make the lessons of history -
including recent history - available to the next generation of
policy makers. Universities also have a role in creating the
networks of serious and responsible people -including their29
faculty, but especially among their students and former students
- who can sustain policy discussions that create more accurate
and useful perceptions and keep them alive in the world. What
they should teach about these issues of perception and
misperception - in the post World War II period and today -only
research can tell us.
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